paulma.org valuation and analysis

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Title Paul
Description Paul Ma is an assistant professor at the Carlson School of Management in the University of
Keywords Paul Ma, Minnesota, Stanford, economics, accounting, finances, disclosure, behavior finance, asset pricing
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WebSite paulma faviconpaulma.org
Host IP 221.2.171.165
Location China
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paulma.org Valuation
US$2,569,221
Last updated: 2023-05-10 02:13:15

paulma.org has Semrush global rank of 4,119,656. paulma.org has an estimated worth of US$ 2,569,221, based on its estimated Ads revenue. paulma.org receives approximately 296,449 unique visitors each day. Its web server is located in China, with IP address 221.2.171.165. According to SiteAdvisor, paulma.org is safe to visit.

Traffic & Worth Estimates
Purchase/Sale Value US$2,569,221
Daily Ads Revenue US$2,372
Monthly Ads Revenue US$71,148
Yearly Ads Revenue US$853,772
Daily Unique Visitors 19,764
Note: All traffic and earnings values are estimates.
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Host Type TTL Data
paulma.org. A 1797 IP: 221.2.171.165
paulma.org. A 1797 IP: 192.30.252.154
paulma.org. A 1797 IP: 192.30.252.153
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paulma.org. NS 21600 NS Record: ns-cloud-d3.googledomains.com.
paulma.org. NS 21600 NS Record: ns-cloud-d4.googledomains.com.
paulma.org. NS 21600 NS Record: ns-cloud-d1.googledomains.com.
HtmlToTextCheckTime:2023-05-10 02:13:15
Paul Ma Assistant Professor Carlson School of Management 321-19th Avenue South Minneapolis, MN 55455 Curriculum Vitae paulma [at] umn.edu Research Teaching Publications How Often do Managers Withhold Information? Coauthors: Jeremy Bertomeu and Iván Marinovic View Abstract We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain but persistent information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (i) managers face disclosure frictions 35% of the time; (ii) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17% of the time; and (iii) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24% of the time. Managers’ strategic withholding motives increase investors’ uncertainty about earnings by 3%. We find that managers’ price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third, in response to investors’ increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure. The Accounting
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